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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is granted to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule
3 and Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
Statement of Issues: The sole issue is a determination of when the
statute of limitations begins to run on the termination of a contract of
employment: at the time of the notification of intent to terminate or upon
3

the actual date of termination when the last work is completed by the
employee and separation is complete.
Standard of Review:

"Because the propriety of a 12(b)[(6)]

dismissal is a question of law, we give the trial court's ruling no deference
and review it under a correctness standard." Ramsey v. Hancock, 79 P.3d
423,424 (Utah App. 2003). "In its review, this court 'must accept the
material allegations of the complaint as true, and the trial court's ruling
should be affirmed only if it clearly appears the complainant can prove no
set of facts in support of his or her claims.'" Id.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code ^78-12-23 sets forth the statute of limitations for a breach
of written contract.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a breach of a contract of employment action in which
Appellant claims damages arising from Appellee's breach of the written
terms for termination under the contract of employment.
The trial court granted Appellee's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the
grounds that Appellant's filing of the complaint was five days over the six
year statute of limitations for breach of a written contract.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1. In 1986, Appellant Steven Clarke (Clarke), took employment with
Appellee Living Scriptures (Living) as a salesman selling religious books
and audio-visual materials door to door, (complaint, ^ 5)
2. Through his work and enthusiasm for products of Living, Clarke
was able to make a good living by working full-time with Living (complaint,

19)
3. Fo the first eleven years of Clarke's association with Living, he
was an at-will employee working without the benefit of a written contract.
On 7 April, 1997, Clarke signed a written contract with Living which set out
Clarke's duties, established his compensation package and classified Clarke
as an independent contractor, responsible for his own taxes.
4. The written contract was for a term of one year, automatically
renewed yearly unless terminated by either party, with Living granted the
right to terminate only as stated in paragraph 10 of the employment contract:
The Company may terminate this Agreement upon the
Salesman's failure to abide by the terms hereof or upon his
failure to meet the minimum sales requirement, which is $3,000
of merchandise per month.
(complaint, TJ20).
5. After signing the contract, Clarke not only continued working as
he had before entering into the contract, i.e., selling company materials door
5

to door, but in August of 1997, he became a manager of Living, recruiting
salespersons, giving on the job training and consulting with upper
management of the company, frequently traveling to the company headquarters in Ogden, Utah, (complaint, % 14).
6. In connection with his newly acquired responsibilities, Clarke was
encouraged to and did renovate his home garage into an office at a cost of
$21,508.99. (complaint, H 13)
7. Between August of 1997 and December of 199 /, numerous oral
and written representations were made by Living to Clarke assuring him that
he was now in management, that he would be a participant in a company
profit sharing plan, and that Living recognized that he was working long and
hard hours preparing for the coming summer sales season, (complaint, %L6).
8. On December 9, 1997, without any prior notice, warning or
caution, Clarke was handed a written notice of termination which
specifically referred to the written independent contractor agreement of 7
April, 1997, and which notice stated that his employment with Living was
terminated, effective in 15 days, or December 24, 1997. (complaint, ^|28)
9. The notice of termination further stated:
Please prepare and submit to us a list of all pending, unfinished
business involving sales of Company products.
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10. During the following 15 days, Clarke continued at his duties,
compiling the list of pending and unfinished business, and finished his
employment relationship with Appellee on December 24, 1997.
11. The complaint in this matter was filed on or about December 17,
2003, one week short of six years after Living's termination of the written
contract.
12. Subsequently, the trial court dismissed Appellant's complaint on
the grounds tha1 the statute of limitations ran on the Appellant's breach of
contract cause of action on December 9, 2003, the month and day that the
notice of termination was handed to Clarke.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. CLARKE WAS WITHIN THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
FOR CONTRACTS AS THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DID NOT
BEGIN TO RUN FROM THE DATE OF NOTICE OF TERMINATION,
BUT FROM THE ACTUAL DATE OF TERMINATION OF WORK.
This appeal focuses on whether Clarke filed his complaint against
Living within the six year period of time required to file a complaint for
breach of a written contract. By ruling that the statute of limitations started
to run on December 7, 1997, the trial court found that Clarke did not have
the right to proceed with his lawsuit against Living, stating that the
complaint was filed outside the six years allowed to pursue a claim upon a
written contract.
7

ARGUMENT
A. Statutory Basis for Claim: Utah Code f78-12-23 sets forth the
standard for the six year statute of limitations:
Within six years — Mesne profits of real property —
Instrument in writing.
An action may be brought within six years:
(1) for the mesne profits of real property;
(2) upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon
an instrument in writing . . .
Clarke argued to the trial court that the statute of limitations did not
start to run until December 24, 1997 which is fifteen days after the notice
was given and was the effective date of termination actually set forth in the
notice and was the date of Clarke's last work performed for Living.
B. A Written Contract Existed Binding Clarke and Living:
1. A written contract prepared by Living and signed by both
Living and Clarke was signed by the parties on 7 April, 1997.
2. The parties abided by the terms of the written contract to the
extent that Living followed its terms and conditions when terminating
Clarke by giving him fifteen days written notice before the
termination was effective.
C. When Does the Statute of Limitations On a Breach of Contract
Claim Begin to Run?

8

1. In DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, Ross &Co. 926 P.2d 835, 843 (Utah
1996) DOIT was a group of depositors of failed Utah thrift institutions who
sued the thrifts' accountants, advisors and officers under various theories of
misfeasance and malfeasance. Defendants raised the defense of the running
of the statute of limitations and the Court states:
Under Utah law, a statute of limitations begins to run against a
party when the cause of action accrues.... As a general rule, a
cause of action accrues when a plaintiff could have first filed
^nd prosecuted an action to successful completion." Id. at 843.
The Court examined the last possible date that a cause of action could
accrue, which date was the last date an accountant's report was
disseminated, and concluded that plaintiffs were nearly four years too late in
filing the complaint. According to the reasoning in DOIT, it was the
damaging effectiveness and negative impact of the false report which
triggered the statute of limitations. Immediately upon dissemination of the
false reports, the damage began to accrue to the DOIT plaintiffs. The
plaintiff could have then immediately instituted a lawsuit based upon the fact
that all the elements of a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation were present
and therefore, the statute of limitations began to run.
In the instant case, the damaging impact of the notice of employment
termination, which notice itself required Clarke to perform additional tasks

9

and duties, did not take place until fourteen days after its issuance when the
impact of the termination letter was effective. Before Clarke could file a
claim for breach of contract, the contract had to be terminated so completely
and absolutely that Clarke could legally claim that his rights under the
employment contract were eliminated. At any time prior to the effective
date, Living could have changed their mind and canceled the termination
Because Clarke had continuing responsibilities under the notice to:
prepare and submit to us a list of all pending, unfinished
business involving sales of Company products.
his duties were not finished, he continued to be responsible to Living, he was
accountable for his actions and any claim for breach of contract was not ripe.
b. Davidson Lumber v. Bonneville Investment, 794 P.2d 11,19 (Utah
1990) states:
"The general policy in Utah is that statutes of limitations
commence to run when the cause of action accrues.... A tort
cause of action accrues when it becomes remediable in the
courts, that is, when all elements of a cause of action come into
being.
Plaintiff sought indemnification from defendant for damages arising
from a defective wooden laminated beam which defendant manufactured
and plaintiff sold. The beam caused the collapse of a building and plaintiff
was required to pay damages arising from the defective beam. Defendant
claimed that the cause of action arose when the beam collapsed, but the
10

Court ruled that the cause of action for indemnification arose only when
plaintiff was required to pay for the damages which arose from the collapse
of the beam. Until plaintiff was required to pay, there was no cognizable
claim for indemnification by plaintiff against defendant, therefore, payment
was an essential element of the claim for indemnification. When Davidson
was absolutely bound to pay the third party claim, then all the elements
needed for the cause of action accrued and only then did the statute of
limitations begii to run.
The case at bar bears a striking resemblance to Davidson, for until
Clarke's employment actually ceased, that is, ended, finished, completed,
concluded and defunct, no cause of action arose for Clarke to file a claim
against Living. If Davidson had filed suit prior to being compelled by a
court of competent jurisdiction to pay damages to the physically injured
third party, Davidson's claim would have been dismissed, not having yet
accrued for no one could divine whether Davidson would actually incur any
damages, i.e., whether a judgment would be rendered against Davidson for
selling a defective product. The basis for the dismissal would be
speculative damages, for there was no knowledge by any party concerning
the actual amount of damages. While there was the assumption that
Davidson would be responsible to pay some measure of damages, until the
11

court actually handed down the judgment, until the court actually and
physically decreed that Davidson was liable for a definite amount of
damages suffered by the physically injured person, there was no cause of
action by Davidson against the defendant. Regardless of the expectations of
a judgment, an anticipated judgment is simply that: anticipated, and cannot
be the basis for a lawsuit until the judgment actually exists.
Such is the case at bar: when the termination notice was presented to
Clarke, the notice stated that Clarke had two weeks of work left at Living.
If, perhaps, on the third day of the two week period, Clarke filed suit
alleging breach of contract and sought an injunction prohibiting Living from
carrying out the threat of termination, Clarke's claim would have been
quickly dismissed by the court, for no cause of action had accrued and no
damages had yet been incurred for termination was not complete, damages
had not ripened and an actionable injury was not present. There was the
threat of injury and damage, but a threat does not ripen into a cause of action
under a breach of contract claim. For instance, Living could have
withdrawn the notice of termination, the parties could have negotiated a new
contract, they could have reaffirmed the existing contract or they could have
extended the deadline for cessation of employment. But when the eventful
fourteenth day melded into the fifteenth day, Clarke then was unequivocally
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terminated, the terms of his contract were void and he then had as his prized
possession not an employment contract, but an accrued cause of action for
breach of contract and various torts.
Thus, it is vital that the lessons of Davidson be preserved in the instant
case, for it states that the statute of limitations does not begin its intractable
march on time until that sometimes elusive cause of action actually and
fully accrues.
c. Retherford v. AT&T Communications 844 P.2d 949, 975 (Utah,
1992) affirming the findings of Davidson, opines that:
Under Utah law, the statute of limitations begins to run when the
cause of action accrues.... In order to determine when the limitations
period began to run, then, we must determine when each of the causes
of action became actionable in the courts.
Retherford asserted tort claims against defendants for on the job
sexual harassment.

The Retherford court, following the dictates of

Davidson, supra, examined when all the elements required to prosecute a
claim for the tort of sexual harassment were final and actionable. Unable to
find judicial fiat declaring when all the elements of retaliatory harassment
accrue, the Court uses the tort of alienation of affections as a comparative
cause of action, and states:
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Applying this standard by analogy, we hold that the statute of
limitations for intentional infliction of emotional distress does not
begin to run until the distress is actually inflicted, i.e., when the
plaintiff suffers severe emotional disturbances.
Although easy to describe, this standard is difficult to apply,
particularly because the element of emotional distress is specific to the
plaintiff in each case. Id. at 975.

Thus a sexual predator may undertake his nefarious acts on day one,
but if the ill effects of his actions do not begin to inflict the victim with pain
and agony and illness until day fifty, then the particular cauje of action does
not accrue, begin to run or create the conditions for the start of the statute of
limitations until the damage is felt and experienced on that fiftieth day.
The Court then carefully examines the time line relating the claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress and establishes a date when the
cause of action for intentional infliction accrued. Then the court examines
the elements for plaintiffs negligent employment claim and states:
Thus, as a general matter, the statute of limitations will not begin to
run on a cause of action for negligent employment until all the
elements of the employee's tort are present. Id. at 977.
The conclusion sustained by the Retherford court is that a cause of
action does not accrue, regardless of the nature of the claim, until all
actionable elements on the cause of action are complete and present.
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d. Brigham Young University v. Paulsen Construction 744 P.2d 1370
(Utah, 1987) Brigham Young sued the contractor which had constructed
certain on-campus buildings some five years earlier. The trial court
dismissed the case, stating that a three year statute of limitations (Utah Code
TJ78-12-26(1) controlled the case, but the Utah Supreme Court determined
that the controlling statute was the six year Utah Code ^{78-12-23(2).
Regarding the application of the statute of limitations, the Supreme Court
states:
The general rule is that a cause of action accrues upon "the
happening of the last event necessary to . . . the cause of action.
Id-at 1373.
In the case at bar, the "last event necessary to the cause of action" was
the final act of Clarke, on December 24, leaving the association of Living for
the last time, having completed his duties set out in the notice of termination
and having failed to convince Living to change its decision to terminate. It
is not until that very last act, that final break with the employer, that the
cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations clock begins to run.
Living would have us believe that the singular event of giving the notice of
termination was the last event necessary to happen starting the running of
the statute, but common experience and the following precedential cases
from California tells us otherwise.
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e. Romano v. Rockwell International, Inc. 926 P.2d 1114 (Cal.
1996). Romano was a 29 year employee of Rockwell International in the
human resource department when one of his superiors became displeased
with Romano and asked for his termination. Romano's immediate
supervisor discussed with Romano the intent of the superior officer to fire
Romano and suggested that Romano accept a one year teaching fellowship
and then retire upon reaching 85 service points under the company's service
plan.

Romano understood that as of December 6, 1988, he was notified

that he would be terminated, and that such termination was going to take
place no later than May 31, 1991. Romano tentatively agreed to the plan,
but never signed any document and did make some effort to reverse the
decision of termination. No replacement for Romano was hired until
December of 1989 at which time Romano was moved to another area of the
company until May of 1990 when he began the teaching fellowship, retiring
on May 31, 1991.
Romano filed a complaint with the California Department of Fair
Employment in September of 1991 and then filed a complaint with the court
on December 9, 1991, alleging wrongful termination, retaliatory termination,
breach of implied contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing and intentional interference with contractual relations.
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Rockwell successfully pursued summary judgment at the trial court on
the grounds that all of Romano's claims were barred by applicable statutes
of limitations, claiming that Romano's causes of action ran from December
6, 1988 when he was first notified that he was being terminated. Romano
argued that the actual date of termination, or May 31, 1991 controlled the
date when the causes of action accrued, but the trial court and the
intermediate court of appeal disagreed, siding with Rockwell.
In analyzing the contesting points of view, the California Supreme
Court first states that "A cause of action for breach of contract does not
accrue before the time of breach." Id. at 1119 and that "There can be no
actual breach of contract until the time specified therein for performance has
arrived." (emphasis in original). Id. and "When the promisor repudiates the
contract before the time for complete performance is complete, then there is
an anticipatory breach occurs." Id.

The court then states:

In the event the promisor repudiates the contract before the time
for his or her performance has arrived, the plaintiff has an election of
remedies-he or she may "treat the repudiation as an anticipatory
breach and immediately seek damages for breach of contract, thereby
terminating the contractual relation between the parties, or he [or she]
can treat the repudiation as an empty threat, wait until the time for
performance arrives and exercises his [or her] remedies for actual
breach if a breach does in fact occur at such time. Romano, supra at
1119.

17

Addressing the issue of the running of the statute of limitations, the
Romano court states:
in the event the plaintiff disregards the repudiation, the statute
of limitations does not begin to run until the time set by the
contract for performance
As Professor Corbin has
explained,
"For the purpose of determining when the period of
limitations begins to run, the defendant's nonperformance at the day specified may be regarded as a
breach of duty as well as the anticipatory repudiation.
The plaintiff should not be penalized for le rving to the
defendant an opportunity to retract his wrongful
repudiation; and he would be so penalized if the statutory
period of limitation is held to begin to run against him
immediately. 4 Corbin Contracts, (1951 ed.) ^989, p.
967. Romano, supra, at 1120.
Romano, the plaintiff, did disregard the notice of termination on
December 6, 1988 and kept working, in the interim allowing Rockwell the
opportunity to withdraw its notice of termination, which, to Romano's
dismay, did not happen.

During the intervening time, Romano worked and

carried out his duties as required by Rockwell, therefore indicating that
Romano elected to rely on the contract despite the breach of implied
contract.
As stated by the court"
Indeed, whether the breach is anticipatory or not, when
there are ongoing contractual obligations the plaintiff may elect
to rely on the contract despite a breach, and the statute of
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limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff has elected to
treat the breach as terminating the contract.... Romano
continued to perform and accept compensation until the time of
actual termination, reflecting an election to treat the contract as
still in effect. Id. at 1120.
The Romano court concluded that the applicable statute of limitations
did not begin to run until the actual date of the termination of Romano's
employment, i.e., May 31, 1991 and that the statute of limitations had not
run against him.
This landmark California case is very similar to the case at bar:
Clarke received the notice of termination, or the anticipatory breach of the
contract, on December 9. He elected to not act on the breach, leaving to
Living the opportunity to retract its wrongful breach of the employment
contract, but when Living did not seize the opportunity to make right its
anticipatory breach of contract, Clarke dutifully left employment on
December 24 which is the date that the final element of the breach of
contract finally accrued.
f. Kasco Services Corp v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86 (Utah 1992) concerns
an employee who had signed an employment contract promising not to
compete against the employer for eighteen months after termination within
the existing territory. Six years later, the original employer, Keene, merged
with Kasco and Kasco sent new employment contracts to all the employees
19

for their signatures and the new contracts contained non-competition
provisions similar to the former contracts. When presented with the new
contract in August of 1988, Benson, who was one of the top salesmen in the
company, refused the sign the new contract, proclaiming that he considered
the noncompetition provisions to be null and void. However, he kept
working until March 15, 1989 when he gave written notice of his
resignation, effective March 1, 1989.
He immediately established a company competing with Kasco and
Kasco moved for the issuance of preliminary injunction based on the
noncompetition agreement. The trial court granted the preliminary
injunction, but ruled that the eighteen month period started from August of
1988 when Benson indicated that he would not abide by the noncompetition
agreement and refused to sign the new employment contract, therefore
putting Kasco on notice that Benson would not abide by the terms of the
restrictive non competition agreement.
The Utah Supreme court determined there was an anticipatory breach
of the noncompetition agreement:
An anticipatory breach occurs when a party to an executory
contract manifests a positive and unequivocal intent to not render its
promised performance when the time fixed for it in the contract
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arrives." Id. at 89, citing Hurwitz v. David K. Richards Co. 436 P.2d
794,796(1968).
Further, the Kasco court, agreeing with the principals of law set out in
Romano, supra, states:
The other party can immediately treat the anticipatory
repudiation as a breach, or it can continue to treat the contract
as operable and urge performance without waiving any right to
sue for that repudiation. . . . Our court of appeals recently
noted:
A party that has received a definite repudiation from the
breaching party to the contract should not be penalized
for its efforts to encourage the breaching party to perform
its end of the bargain, (emphasis added) BreuerHarrison, Inc. v. Combe 799 P.2d 716, 725 (Utah App
1990). Kasco, supra at 89.

We need not decide here whether Benson's
announcement that he did not intend to abide by the
noncompetition covenant was an anticipatory repudiation. It
makes no difference in this case. If his remarks were an
anticipatory repudiation, Kasco simply had an election. It could
treat the remark as a breach, or it could continue to treat the
contract as operable and encourage performance with waiving
any rights under the contract. If there was no anticipatory
repudiation, the noncompetition covenant remained in full
force. Therefore, anticipatory repudiation or not, it was error
for the trial court to rule that the eighteen months began to run
when Kasco was put on notice of Benson's intent not to comply
with the restrictive covenant. The beginning time should have
been the actual date of Benson's resignation. Id. at 89.
Again, referring to the facts of the instant case, the termination of
Clarke's employment, the actual, not anticipatory breach of the contract,

21

took place on December 24, the actual date of Clarke's cessation of services
for Living.
g. Mullins v. Rockwell International 936 P.2d 1246 (Cal. 1997).
Mullins was a 22 year employee of Rockwell and became a factory manager
when an antagonistic person, Rubenstein, became president of the division.
In January of 1988, Rubenstein consolidated factories and demoted Mullins
to the position of project manager over an essentially non-existent project.
Mullins was excluded from management meetings, was not allowed to
interview for new positions, had his compensation substantially reduced and
suffered humiliation and distress. By October of 1989, he retired.
He filed a lawsuit in September of 1991, alleging constructive
discharge, wrongful termination, breach of covenant of good faith and fair
dealing and breach of oral employment contract. Rockwell moved for
summary judgment on the issue of the running of the statute of limitations,
claiming that the two year statute began to run when Mullins had notice of
his demotion in January of 1988. The California Supreme Court disagreed,
and summarized its decision in Romano, supra:
We noted that in a contract action, the statute of limitations
does not begin to run before the alleged breach occurs, and that
the breach of promise alleged in Romano consisted of the
termination of employment without good cause.... In addition,
22

we observed that even if the notification of termination in that
case were viewed as a breach of the employment contract, such
notification constituted an anticipatory breach that gave the
plaintiff an election of remedies.... The plaintiff could elect to
sue on the breach at once, or he or she could elect to continue to
perform until the beach announced by the defendant came to
pass. Because the plaintiff in Romano elected to continue to
perform, we concluded that the statute of limitations began to
run when the defendant's announced breach actually came to
pass, that is, when employment terminated. Mullins at 1249,
(citations omitted)
The Court examines the elements of constructive discharge, which is
not at issue in tJ e case at bar, and discusses the virtues and disadvantages of
using various dates to determine when the statute of limitations begins
running. The rule stated out by the Court is:
The statute of limitations should not force the employee to
institute premature legal proceedings, whether at the time the
employer announces an intention to fire the employee, or at the
time the employer begins to coerce a resignation by creating or
knowingly permitting intolerable working conditions [cite]
Finally, a rule providing that the statute of limitations begins to
run on the date of actual termination of employment has the
virtue of certainty. Id- at 1250.
And so should not this Court impose upon employees the burden of
instituting premature legal proceedings before the employee and employer
have the opportunity to reconcile, to negotiate, to come to terms, but rather
allow the statute of limitations to run from the actual date of the complete
cessation of an employee-employer relationship.

23

CONCLUSION
The core of the argument is simply whether upon a breach of contract
of employment, the statute of limitations begins to run from the date that the
employee is informed of the intention to complete the firing, or whether it
begins to run upon the date that the termination is complete and final.
Utilizing the principals enunciated in Utah law that a cause of action only
begins to accrue when all the elements of the cause of action have occurred,
supplemented by the well-considered California cases abc 'e which reason
that the notice of termination is but an anticipatory breach, subject to
revocation and that the statute of limitations begins to run upon the event of
the actual and final termination, it is clear in this matter that the statute of
limitations for Clarke began to run on the last day of his employment,
December 24 and that his filing of the complaint in this matter was within
the applicable statute of limitations.
Therefore, this matter should be remanded to the trial court with
instructions that Appellee is to file an answer and this matter should
continue to trial on the merits.

ROBERT D. ROSE, Attorney for Appellant
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PROOF OF SERVICE
I certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Appellant's Brief to:
Heidi E. C. Leithead
Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless
185 South State, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
on the 7th day of October, 2004.
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IN THE'THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

STEPHEN CLARKE,
Plaintiff,

[Piupuscd}
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
WITH PREJUDICE

vs.
LIVING SCRIPTURES, INC,
a Utah corporation,
Defendant.

Civil No. 030928443
Judge Stephen L. Henriod

This matter came on for hearing before the Honorable Stephen L. Henroid on the lz~
day of /QrPrd

, 2004, at Vxjk> o'clock p. .m. Plaintiff was represented by his counsel

of record, Robert D. Rose. Defendant was represented by its counsel of record, Heidi E. C.
Leithead and the law firm of Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless. Having reviewed the
memoranda filed by the parties and having heard oral argument thereon and good cause
appearing therefor,

Order of Dismissal - Page 1

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that this matter shall be and
the same hereby is dismissed with prejudice on the ground that, based on the facts alleged in the
Complaint and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in favor of plaintiff,
A,

Plaintiffs First Cause of Action (Breach of Employment Contract) is

barred by the six-year statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23.
B«

Plaintiffs Second Cause of Action (Unjust Enrichment), Third Cause of

Action (Detrimental Reliance), Fourth Cause of Action (Bad Faith), and Sixth Cause of
Action (Lost Business Opportunity) are barred by the four-year statute of limitations set
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.
C.

Plaintiffs Sixth [sic] Cause of Action (Breach of the Implied Covenant of

Good Faith and Fair Dealing) is barred by the six-year statute of limitations set forth in
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 and/or by the four-year statute of limitations set forth in Utah
Code Ann. §78-12-25.
D.

Plaintiffs Fifth Cause of Action (Fraudulent Misrepresentation of Present

Existing Facts] is barred by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-26.
E.

Plaintiffs Seventh Cause of Action (Punitive Damages) is barred on the

ground that, because each of plaintiffs claims sounding in tort are barred by the
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applicable statutes of limitation, plaintiff cannot allege a tort cause of action to support a
claim for punitive damages against defendant.
ENTERED this Jl_

day of

&prl£

, 2004.

BY THE COURT:

Stephen L. Henriod
District Court Judg
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Robert D. Rose
Attorney for Plaintiff

Heidi E. C. Leithead
Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless
Attorneys for Defendant
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